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An increasing number of longitudinal data sets collect expectations information regarding 
a variety of future individual level events and decisions, providing researchers with the 
opportunity to explore expectations over micro variables in detail. We provide a 
theoretical framework and an econometric methodology to use that type of information to 
test the Rational Expectations hypothesis in models of individual behavior, and present 
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1. Introduction 
 
An increasing number of large longitudinal data sets now collect expectations information regarding future 
individual level events and decisions, providing researchers with the opportunity to explore expectations over micro 
variables in detail. We present a theoretical framework and an econometric methodology to use that type of 
information to test the Rational Expectations (RE) hypothesis in models of individual behavior. We then use the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the youth cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market 
Experience (NLSY79) to analyze retirement and education expectations, respectively. We find that these two types 
of expectations are consistent with the RE hypothesis. Our results support the use of a wide variety of models in 
economics that assume rational behavior. 
Our definition and approach to testing the RE hypothesis will be consistent with the views expressed by the 
precursors of this assumption. We will maintain that agents’ subjective beliefs about the evolution of a set of 
variables of interest coincide with the objectively measurable population probability measure. This is consistent 
with the characterization of Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972). The main difference is that instead of concentrating on 
forecasts of market level variables we focus on how individuals form expectations over micro variables that are in 
part under their control. This RE assumption at the micro level underlies a majority of the research in applied fields, 
and it is the common foundation of most work in dynamic models of individual behavior. Economists are growing 
increasingly interested in this type of measures as possible sources of additional variation in individual 
characteristics that might reflect underlying differences in preference and beliefs parameters. 
The debate over whether testing rational expectations is a worthwhile enterprise goes back almost three 
decades. Prescott (1977) expressed a strong opinion against testing the hypothesis, while Simon (1979), Tobin 
(1980), Revankar (1980), and Lovell (1986) considered the direct analysis of expectations an important project. The 
efforts to test the hypothesis began in the context of the life cycle permanent income hypothesis in a stream of 
literature that started with the work of Hall (1978), and then compared forecasts of market variables with 
realizations like in Figlewski and Watchtel (1981, 1983), Kimball Dietrich and Joines (1983), de Leeuw and 
McKelvey (1981 and 1984), Gramlich (1983), and more recently Davies and Lahiri (1999), and Christiansen 
(2003). Finally, work by Leonard (1982) analyzed wage expectations of employers, and Fair (1993) analyzed the 
question in the context of large macroeconomic models. In all these cases the concern was with market level   2 
variables, and the evidence in these and many other studies is mixed. Below, we propose a slightly different 
approach in line with Bernheim (1990) and Benítez-Silva and Dwyer (2003), and use panel data available through 
the HRS and the NLSY79 to follow two very different cohorts of individuals planning an important decision for 
people their age, retirement and education. 
The conceptual model and the econometric specifications are presented in section 2. Section 3 provides 
information about the data used and reports our main findings. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. A Model and a Test of Expectations using Individual Level Variables 
 
Suppose an individual and an econometrician are trying to predict a variable X that the individual has decided will 
be determined by a function of a sequence of random variables: 
12 ( , ,..., ). T Xh ω ωω =     (1) 
The sequence of vector-valued variables inside the parenthesis will be observed by the individual at time periods 
t=1,2,…,T. Then the individual will take action X after some or all the ωt’s have been observed.  
Let  {} 1
t
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= Ω= be the information known at period t and let  ( )
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where E is the expectations operator. This is the most commonly used representation of the RE hypothesis, which 
takes as the rational expectation of a variable its conditional mathematical expectation (Sargent and Wallace 1976).
1 
This guarantees that errors in expectations will be uncorrelated with the set of variables known at time t. 
  Variables included in the vector representing the information set Ω, come from models of individual 
behavior and might include socio-economic and demographic characteristics. Using the law of iterated expectations 
and assuming that the new information is correctly forecasted by agents (its conditional distribution not just its 
mean), from (2) we get: 
                                                 
1 Schmalensee (1976) using experimental data emphasizes the importance of analyzing higher moments of the distribution of 
expectations. Due to data limitations we are unable to do so in our analysis.   3 
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where ωt+1 represents information that comes available between periods t and t+1. Then from (3) we can write the 
evolution of expectations through time as 




t X X η    (4) 




t t X E X Ω − = + + + η  and therefore E(ηt+1|Ωt)=0.  Notice that ηt+1 is a function of the new information 
received since period t,  ωt+1.  From this characterization of the evolution of expectations we can test the RE 
hypothesis with the following regression: 
1
1, , , 1,
ee
t i ti ti t i XX α βγ ε ++ =+ + Ω + , (5) 
where α is a constant, and γ is a vector of parameters that estimate the effect of information in period t on period’s 
t+1 expectations. The RE hypothesis implies that α=γ=0, and β=1. A weak RE test, in the terminology of Lovell 
(1986) and Bernheim (1990), assumes that γ is equal to a vector of zeros, and tests for α=0 and β=1––effectively 
testing whether expectations follow a random walk. The strong RE test is less restrictive and also tests for γ=0. 
Econometric Specifications 
Estimating (5) is in principle straightforward but the likely presence of measurement error in the dependent 
variable and its lag and sample selection, complicate the methodology. Here we follow Wooldridge (2002, p. 567) 
to consistently estimate the effect of previous expectation on current expectation, and from (5) we write 
1, 1 , 1 ,1 1,1
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where we first estimate the selection equation (8) using a probit specification, where Yi is equal to one if both the 
expectation in period t and the expectation in period t+1 are observed, which means that the individual answers a 
question about his or her future retirement or future educational attainment, depending on the data set. Z3 in 
equation (8) includes all the exogenous variables and any exclusion restriction of the selection equation with 
respect to the structural equation (6). We then consistently estimate (6) by performing a modified 2SLS procedure,   4 
where the first stage includes as instruments all the exogenous variables used in (8), the Inverse Mills’ ratio from 
the probit equation, and any additional instruments, Z2 in (7), the validity of which will be tested. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Results 
To test the RE hypothesis on the retirement expectations of older workers we use all five available waves of the 
HRS, a nationally representative longitudinal survey of 7,700 households headed by an individual aged 51 to 61 as 
of the first interviews in 1992-93. We include respondents that are working, full time or part time, in any wave, and 
non-employed (but searching for jobs) that report retirement plans. In each wave respondents are asked when they 
plan to fully or partially depart from the labor force and whether they have thought about retirement. Most of the 
people who have not thought about retirement do not report an expected age.
2 
To test the RE hypothesis on educational attainment expectations of the youth we use the NSLY79, a nationally 
representative longitudinal survey that follows individuals over the period 1979 to 2000, who were 14 to 21 years 
of age as of January 1, 1979. Interviews were conducted on an annual basis though 1994, after which they adopted 
a biennial interview schedule. In the 1979, 1981, and 1982 surveys, each respondent was asked what the highest 
educational grade level they expected to complete.  This analysis makes use of the responses in the 1981 and 1982 
waves.  The sample is selected by excluding respondents of ages greater than 15 as at January 1, 1979 (to avoid 
individuals that have completed their schooling), military entrants, and respondents never observed to enroll in high 
school. The resulting sample size includes 2,395 respondents. 
Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents the weak and strong RE tests for the sample from the HRS, and Table 2 presents the tests 
for the NLSY79 sample. The HRS data support the weak and strong RE hypotheses in the augmented model that 
corrects for sample selection and measurement error in the report of expected retirement age, resulting in a 
selection corrected IV specification, and the NLSY79 supports the RE hypotheses in expected educational 
attainment both in the IV and the corrected IV specifications.
3 
                                                 
2 Many of them report that they will never retire.  If they have not given it any thought, and they say they will never retire, we 
treat their expected retirement age as missing.  If they give a retirement age we treat them as non-missing. We have assigned an 
age of 77 for those who never retire (estimated longevity). 
3 The findings are robust across many specifications and empirical techniques including panel data methods.   5 
We perform an F-test based on the null hypothesis that β=1 in equation (4), to test the RE hypothesis. We 
obtain coefficients for β of 1.05 for the weaker test using the retirement expectations data and 0.981 using the 
education expectations data, which cannot reject the hypothesis that both expectations follow a random walk. For 
the pooled OLS estimation this test is effectively a unit root test, and as such, following the literature on testing unit 
roots in panel data surveyed by Bond, Nauges, and Windmeijer (2002), we perform a correction to obtain the 
appropriate critical value. However, this matters very little since the unit root hypothesis is soundly rejected. 
For the strong test we estimate the model of equations (6) to (8), using the corrected IV procedure. The β 
parameter is estimated to be equal to 0.94 in the HRS and 0.991 in the NLSY79, in both cases very precisely 
estimated, and clearly failing to reject the RE hypothesis. Notice the importance in the HRS of both instrumenting 
the previous period’s expectations, and controlling for sample selection. We also report in both tables tests that 
show that we cannot reject that we have robust instruments and that the overidentification in the 2SLS is correct. In 
fact the reported results are the product of robustly estimating the system of equations via GMM, which provides 
robustness against unknown forms of heterokedasticity. 
The strong test includes information available at time t that should not be significant after controlling for 
time t expectations. In both samples after controlling for sample selection and measurement error we find that most 
of these factors are no longer significant. The joint hypotheses that all the coefficients are equal to zero cannot be 
rejected at any traditional level of significance.
4 
Like in Bernheim (1990), the objective behind instrumental variables estimation here is to correct for 
potential measurement error in the reported expected age of retirement at time t. Since people are reporting 
expectations over uncertain events, we expect some degree of reporting error that may be correlated with 
unobserved factors. We use time t subjective survival to age 85 probabilities and an indicator of smoking behavior 
as instruments (exclusion restrictions) for expected retirement age, and the educational attainment of the parents as 
instruments (exclusion restrictions) for expected years of education. In the selection corrected IV, the inverse Mills’ 
ratio is an additional instrument, along with the rest of the exogenous variables from the selection equation, as 
                                                 
4 It is true, however, that this is trivially the case if individuals never adjust their expectations. But plenty of adjustment goes on 
in the data, and it seems implausible that all can be blamed on measurement error.   6 
suggested by Wooldridge (2002).
5 In the HRS the strongest specification is the selection corrected IV. Interestingly 
in this case, this corrected IV technique seems to circumvent one of the traditional drawbacks of instrumental 
variables estimation, that is, the large increase in standard errors in the IV estimates. The importance of the 
selection correction in this setting, contrasts with the results by Bernheim (1990) where selection was not 
important, and the inability to reject rationality was in part the product of large standard errors. In the NSLY79 
although we cannot reject the presence of sample selection in the weak test, the RE results do not depend on this 
additional correction. 
4. Conclusions 
We have tested the Rational Expectations hypothesis in the formation of expectations for retirement and 
educational attainment. In both samples we cannot reject the RE hypothesis after controlling for reporting errors 
and sample selection. These results support the use of the expectations variables in the growing number of data sets 
that provide this type of information, and support the use of economic models that use this assumption. The results 
in this analysis are meant to foster further discussion and research on the issues surrounding the role of expectations 
in economic modeling.  
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Table 1. Tests of Rational Expectations- Health and Retirement Study 
 
Variables  Pooled OLS  IV  Corrected IV 
Weak RE Test (H0: Beta=1): 
Constant 
Expected Retirement Aget 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 
Strong RE Test (H0: Beta =1): 
Constant 
Expected Retirement Aget 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension  
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes problems    
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walking multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   Age 
   White 
   Male 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Married 
   Wave 1-2 




Test of joint Significance of Covariates 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 










































































































































Cannot Rej. P-v=.0775 
Cannot Rej. P-v=.5338 
Reject P-v=.0000 
4,634   9 
Table 2. Tests of Rational Expectations- NSLY79 
 
  
Variables  Pooled OLS  IV  Corrected IV 
Weak RE Test (H0: Beta=1):  Reject  Cannot Reject  Cannot Reject 
  Constant          3.688(0.199)**            0.366(0.528)            0.424(0.409) 
  Expected Education Levelt 
  Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
        0.739(0.014)** 
- 
          0.981(0.038)** 
- 
          0.981(0.029)** 
         -1.016(0.499)** 
  Test of Over-Id Restrictions  -  Cannot Rej. P-v=.795  Cannot Rej. P-v=.517 
  Test of Weak Instruments  -  Reject P-v=.0000  Reject P-v=.0000 
       
Strong RE Test (H0: Beta=1):  Reject  Cannot Reject  Cannot Reject 
Constant          3.206(1.119)**           -0.882(1.534)           -0.823(1.669) 
Expected Education Levelt          0.662(0.016)**            0.991(0.067)**  0.991(0.067)** 
   Inverse Mills’ Ratio  -  -  -0.086(0.832) 
Economic Factors at Time t       
Avg. Family Income ($1,000)          0.007(0.002)**            0.001(0.002)            0.001(0.002) 
         
Demographic Factors at Time t       
Age         -0.170(0.071)**            0.001(0.089)            0.001(0.088) 
Male          0.004(0.064)               0.002(0.070)            2E-04(0.072) 
Black          0.272(0.084)**            0.177(0.093)*            0.175(0.093)* 
Hispanic          0.093(0.095)            0.074(0.109)            0.071(0.112) 
Siblings         -0.021(0.013)            0.009(0.017)            0.009(0.017) 
Highest Grade Completed          0.407(0.044)**            0.069(0.086)            0.065(0.092) 
Labor Market Experience          4E-04(0.049)            0.004(0.054)           -0.006(0.054) 
Northeastern Residence          0.162(0.106)            0.136(0.122)            0.130(0.133) 
North-Central Residence          0.098(0.103)            0.067(0.112)            0.057(0.143) 
Southern Residence          0.139(0.099)            0.122(0.116)            0.111(0.153) 
Rural Residence         -0.049(0.082)            0.130(0.093)            0.128(0.097) 
Local Unemployment Rate          0.023(0.035)            0.057(0.038)            0.056(0.040) 
       
Adj. R
2  0.556  -  - 
Test of Joint Sig. of Covariates  Reject. P-v=0.0000  Cannot Rej. P-v=.386  Cannot Rej. P-v=.710 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions  -  Cannot Rej. P-v=.478  Cannot Rej. P-v=.481 
Test of Weak Instruments  -  Reject P-v=.0000  Reject P-v=.0000 
Number of Observations  2,316  2,316  2,316  10 
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Appendix (submitted as supporting material only, not as part of the paper) 
 
Table A.1a.  Summary Statistics. HRS. 
 
Variables Full  Sample 
N=23,669 
Retirement Plans and Outcomes 
   Expected retirement age 
   Employee  
   Self employed 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
    
Economic factors 
   Net worth (in $100,000) 
   Housing wealth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent’ Income (in $1,000) 
   Has a private pension 
   
Health Insurance 
   Employer provided 
         Retiree 
   Government 
   Private 
   No health insurance 
 
Health factors 
   Health limitation 
   Good-Very Good-Excellent Health 
   Doctor visits 
   Probability of living to age 85 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes 
   Arthritis  
   Difficulty walking multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs 
   Stroke  
   Heart problems  
   Cancer  
   Smoke
 
    
Demographic factors 
   Age  
   Male 
   Married 
   Bachelor’s degree 
   Professional degree 
   Mother reached retirement age 
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Table A.1b.  Summary Statistics by Sample Selection. HRS. 
 
Variables Thought  About 
N=11,062 
Not Thought  
N= 12,607 
Retirement Plans and Outcomes 
   Expected retirement age 
   Employee  
   Self employed 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Economic factors 
   Net worth (in $100,000) 
   Housing wealth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent’s Income (in $1,000) 
   Has a private pension  
 
Health Insurance 
   Employer Provided 
         Retiree 
   Government 
   Private 
   No health insurance 
 
Health factors 
   Health limitation 
   Good-Very Good-Excellent Health 
   Doctor visits 
   Probability of living to age 85 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes 
   Arthritis  
   Difficulty walking multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs 
   Stroke  
   Heart Problems  
   Cancer  
   Smoke
 
    
Demographic factors 
   Age  
   Male 
   Married 
   Bachelor’s degree 
   Professional degree 
   Mother reached retirement age 
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Table A.2.  Selection Equation Results – HRS - Probability of Thinking about Retirement 
 
Variables Probit  Marg. 
Effects 
RE Probit  Marginal 
Effects 
Economic Factors 
   Net wealth (in $100,000) 
   Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-Employed 
   Pension 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health Factors 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   Probability of living to 85 
   Diff. walking multiple blocks 
   Diff. climbing stairs 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes 
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart problems 
   Arthritis 
    
Demographic Factors 
   Age 
   Age squared 
   Male 
   White 
   Bachelor’s degree 
   Professional degree 
   Married 
   Mother reached retirement age 
   Father reached retirement age 
   Wave 1 
   Wave 2 
   Wave 3 
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Table A.3.1.  First Stage Results for Weak RE Test using IV. HRS. 
 
Variables 1
st Stage of IV  1
st Stage of Corrected IV 
Weak RE Test: 
Constant 
Prob. Of Living to 85 
Smoking 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes    
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walking multiple 
blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   White 
   Male 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Married 
   Wave 1-2 




Test of Weak Instruments 




























































































Table A.3.2.  First Stage Results for Strong RE Test using IV. HRS 
 
Variables  1
st Stage of IV  1
st Stage of Corrected IV 
Strong RE Test: 
Constant 
Prob. of living to 85 
Smoking 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health  
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes    
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walking multiple 
blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   Age 
   White 
   Male 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Married 
   Wave 1-2 




Test of Weak Instruments 
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Variables Full  Sample 
N=2,395 
Education Plans and Outcomes   
Highest Grade Expected to Complete   13.692(2.245) 
Highest Grade Completed  9.888(0.878) 
   
Economics Factors   
Avg. Family Income ($1,000)  18.324(15.877) 
  





Labor Market Experience  0.492(0.678) 
Mother’s Education  10.865(2.960) 
Father’s Education  10.837(3.642) 
Northeastern Residence  0.188(0.391) 
Northcentral Residence  0.247(0.431) 
Southern Residence  0.362(0.481) 
Rural Residence  0.231(0.421) 
Local Unemployment Rate  3.248(0.965) 
  
Religious Affiliation   
Protestant 0.052(0.222) 
Baptist 0.287(0.453) 
Catholic 0.339(0.474)  16 
 
 








Education Plans and Outcomes    
Highest Grade Expected to Complete   13.692(2.245)  - 
Highest Grade Completed  9.918(0.856)  9.013(1.044) 
    
Economics Factors    
Avg. Family Income ($1,000)  18.420(15.959)  15.491(13.034) 
    
Demographic Factors    
Male 0.522(0.500)  0.468(0.502) 
Black 0.268(0.443)  0.190(0.395) 
Hispanic 0.177(0.382)  0.228(0.422) 
Siblings 3.611(2.521)  3.418(2.442) 
Labor Market Experience  0.476(0.680)  0.342(0.597) 
Mother’s Education  10.886(2.937)  10.266(3.533) 
Father’s Education  10.848(3.635)  10.494(3.846) 
Northeastern Residence  0.187(0.390) 0.203(0.404) 
Northcentral Residence  0.252(0.434)  0.089(0.286) 
Southern Residence  0.387(0.483)  0.114(0.320) 
Rural Residence  0.236(0.425)  0.076(0.267) 
Local Unemployment Rate  3.258(0.967)  2.962(0.854) 
    
Religious Affiliation    
Protestant 0.051(0.220)  0.089(0.286) 
Baptist 0.290(0.454)  0.215(0.414) 




Table A.5.  Selection Equation Results NLSY79 
  Variables Probit  Marginal  Effects 
Economics Factors    
Avg. Family Income ($1,000)  0.005(0.005)  2E-04 
    
Demographic Factors    
Male 0.131(0.118)  0.004 
Black   0.291(0.177)*  0.008 
Hispanic 0.075(0.174)  0.002 
Siblings    0.044(0.026)*  0.001 
Highest Grade Completed     0.499(0.066)**  0.016 
Labor Market Experience    0.169(0.098)*  0.005 
Northeastern Residence     0.415(0.150)**  0.010 
Northcentral Residence     0.893(0.187)**  0.019 
Southern Residence     1.108(0.181)**  0.031 
Rural Residence     0.384(0.190)**  0.010 
Local Unemployment Rate     0.150(0.070)**  0.005 
    
Religious Affiliation    
Protestant  -0.044(0.237)               -0.001 
Baptist  -0.036(0.172)               -0.001 
Catholic     0.415(0.164)**  0.012 
Constant     -4.578(0.695)**  - 
    
Predicted Probability   0.988   
Log Likelihood  -263.52   
Pseudo-R
2 0.241   




Table A. 6-1.  First Stage Results for Weak RE Test using IV. NSLY79 
Variables 1
st Stage of IV  1
st Stage of Corrected IV 
Weak RE Test:    
Constant  10.838(0.170)** 11.243(1.522)** 
Mother’s Education    0.109(0.020)**    0.088(0.019)** 
Father’s Education    0.153(0.016)**    0.110(0.016)** 
Inverse Mills Ratio  -            -1.972(0.884)** 
    
Economics Factors    
Avg. Family Income ($1,000)  -    0.008(0.003)** 
    
Demographic Factors    
Age -    -0.445(0.090)** 
Male  -            -0.030(0.082) 
Black  -    0.290(0.109)** 
Hispanic  -    0.474(0.144)** 
Siblings  -            -0.031(0.018)* 
Highest Grade Completed  -    0.825(0.073)** 
Labor Market Experience  -            -0.036(0.064) 
Northeastern Residence  -            -0.092(0.151) 
Northcentral Residence  -            -0.170(0.166) 
Southern Residence  -            -0.166(0.172) 
Rural Residence  -   -0.502(0.107)** 
Local Unemployment Rate  -            -0.093(0.047)** 
    
Adj. R
2 0.128  0.263 
Test of Weak Instruments  F(2,2313)=171.38  F(15,2299)=47.64 








st Stage of IV  1
st Stage of Corrected IV 
Weak RE Test:    
Constant  10.013(1.419)** 11.243(1.522)** 
Mother’s Education    0.086(0.019)**    0.088(0.019)** 
Father’s Education    0.111(0.016)**    0.110(0.016)** 
Inverse Mills Ratio  -          -1.972(0.884)** 
    
Economics Factors    
Avg. Family Income ($1,000)    0.009(0.003)**    0.008(0.003)** 
    
Demographic Factors    
Age  -0.467(0.090)**           -0.445(0.090)** 
Male           0.001(0.081)           -0.030(0.082) 
Black   0.332(0.107)**  0.290(0.109)** 
Hispanic   0.549(0.130)**  0.474(0.134)** 
Siblings          -0.024(0.018)           -0.031(0.018)* 
Highest Grade Completed   0.936(0.053)**  0.825(0.073)** 
Labor Market Experience          -0.004(0.062)           -0.036(0.064) 
Northeastern Residence           0.061(0.135)           -0.092(0.151) 
Northcentral Residence           0.058(0.131)           -0.170(0.166) 
Southern Residence           0.094(0.127)           -0.166(0.172) 
Rural Residence          -0.444(0.104)**           -0.502(0.107)** 
Local Unemployment Rate         -0.065(0.045)           -0.093(0.047)** 
    
Adj. R
2 0.262  0.263 
Test of Weak Instruments  F(2,2300)=72.59  F(2,2299)=73.08 
Number of Observations  2,316  2,316 